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TAKING SUPREMACY SERIOUSLY:
THE CONTRARIETY OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES
Donald L. Doernberg*
INTRODUCTION
Immunities from suit, whether for governments or government officials,
occupy a semi-sacred place in our jurisprudence. Trumpeting sovereign
immunity, 1 state and federal governments have long asserted that they are
not subject to suit unless they have consented, and the courts have
supported them. The U.S. Supreme Court has also created common law
immunities for government officials and municipalities. Both kinds of
immunity rest on a pervasive misunderstanding of English legal history and
a convenient disinclination to consider the distinctive history and political
philosophy that underlies the federal government. This Article does not
examine the nuances of the official and municipal immunity doctrines, but
rather questions their legitimacy in light of constitutional supremacy. 2 It
focuses on immunity of executive department officials and municipalities,
but casts some doubt on judicial immunity as well.
The remaining three parts of this Article elaborate the thesis that neither
English legal history, the United States Constitution, nor the political
philosophy that underlies it offers any support for the common law
immunities from civil damages that the Supreme Court has created for
officials and municipalities that violate constitutional rights. Because these
immunities descended from the concept of sovereign immunity, Part I
discusses that concept. Part I.A addresses the political philosophy that
formed the foundation of the American government. It also briefly
canvasses what sovereign immunity has meant in England—at least since
the time of Edward I in the late thirteenth century—where its monarchs are
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A., Yale University 1966; J.D.,
Columbia University 1969. I am honored to acknowledge the wise criticism and valuable
suggestions that Professor Susan Bandes offered on an earlier draft. I gratefully
acknowledge the fine research and editing assistance of Pace University law students
Meghan Marshall, J.D. 2010, Tanya Manderson and Monika Urbanowicz, J.D. 2011, Lauren
Bachtel and Kerriann Stout, J.D. Candidates 2013, as well as David MacIsaac, J.D.
Candidate 2013 at Georgetown Law School. I am very grateful for the meticulous work and
valuable editing suggestions of the editors of the Fordham Law Review; they reminded me
once again how much I gain from the students with whom I am privileged to work. I am
indebted to Professor Ronald Dworkin, who long ago powerfully urged us all to keep our
eyes on the legal supremacy ball.
1. “A government’s immunity from being sued in its own courts without its consent.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 818 (9th ed. 2009).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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immune in their persons, but where subjects suffering violation of their
rights at government hands have always had effective remedies, either
against the Crown by way of the petition of right or against Crown officials
in ordinary actions for damages. Part I.B then reviews sovereign immunity
in the United States, contrasting it with its English forbear.
Part II discusses officials’ and municipalities’ immunities. Part II.A
considers the English practice and shows that Crown officials enjoyed no
immunity from suit for unlawful actions undertaken in the name of the
Crown. Part II.B reviews immunity in the United States. It notes that the
original Constitution did contain one immunity—for federal legislators3—
but no others. As Part II.B points out, that legislative immunity mirrors one
established in England after the Glorious Revolution. The Supreme Court
takes the position that the other immunities that it has created also find their
roots in England. Part II.B questions that assumption, arguing the
implausibility that the Framers constitutionalized only one immunity of
many. In fact, the other immunities did not exist in England; they are
home-grown and constitutionally unsupportable. Finally, Part II.C will
examine the extension of the Court’s flawed reasoning in creating
municipal immunities.
This Article concludes that the Court has led itself astray with its
immunity doctrines. It argues that the Court’s supposition of immunities
flies in the face of the intense interest in the former colonies in having a bill
of rights appended to the Constitution as quickly as possible after
ratification. Finally, it points out that the Court’s doctrines condone and
protect official disobedience to constitutional commands establishing
individual rights and suggests that by so doing, the doctrines negate
constitutional supremacy and undermine the rule of law.
I. PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
This symposium concerns official and municipal immunities, but a brief
discussion of sovereign immunity in the United States and England is
necessary to set the stage. Relations between England and its American
colonies soured through the mid-eighteenth century; the story needs no
repetition. The resulting revolution was the first recorded instance of
colonies overthrowing the colonial power and establishing their own
government. 4 The real novelty, however, occurred after the war ended.

3. See id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The Eleventh Amendment, ratified in 1795, provides some
sort of immunity-like protection to the states from being sued by individuals in federal court,
but its contours are unclear. See infra note 225.
4. In the musical 1776, Benjamin Franklin remarks to John Adams, “You talk as if
independence were the rule! It’s never been done before! No colony has ever broken from
the parent stem in the history of the world!” PETER STONE & SHERMAN EDWARDS, 1776: A
MUSICAL PLAY (1970). That was not the only unique thing about the American experience.
“[T]he impartial historian would report that no government had ever been instituted on the
basis of popular consent[.]” Peter S. Onuf, Introduction, in DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: THE
ORIGIN AND INFLUENCE OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING DOCUMENT ix, ix (Christian Y. Dupont &
Peter S. Onuf eds., 2008).
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The first attempt to create a national government was a well known flop.5
The Articles of Confederation took effect in 1781, and within six years,
their inadequacy caused the Americans to discard them. 6
A. The Philosophical Foundation of America and Sovereign Immunity
in England
The ensuing convention to remedy the Articles of Confederation’s flaws
produced the Constitution, and its Preamble differs markedly from the
Articles’ Preamble. The latter recited that the states were creating the
national government, 7 but by 1787, “We the People” created the federal
government. 8 The state ratification conventions represented the people, not
the states. 9 Sovereignty exists in the people, not in the government. 10 In
5. See JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 1789-1801, at 1 (1960) (explaining that
Americans’ “first effort, the Articles of Confederation, . . . failed to meet the urgent financial
needs of the nation, uphold national rights abroad, and counteract the strong centrifugal
forces at work in the United States”).
6. See, e.g., DONALD L. DOERNBERG, C. KEITH WINGATE & DONALD H. ZEIGLER,
FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 607 (4th ed. 2008) (“The
colonial experience had sensitized the colonists to the problems of a strong and unresponsive
central government. The Articles of Confederation reflected that sensitivity too well: they
created so weak a central government that the nation was forced to discard it in only four
[sic] years.”). Professor Corwin, however, cautions us to remember that “the task before the
Convention arose by no means exclusively from the inadequacies of the Articles of
Confederation for ‘the exigencies of the Union’; of at least equal urgency were the questions
which were thrust upon its attention by the shortcomings of the state governments for their
purposes.” EDWARD S. CORWIN, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the
Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST.
REV. 511 (1925), reprinted in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: ESSAYS BY EDWARD S.
CORWIN 1, 3 (Alpheus T. Mason & Gerald Garvey eds., 1964).
7. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, pmbl. (“Whereas the Delegates of the
United States of America in Congress assembled . . . agree to certain articles of
Confederation and perpetual Union . . . .”).
8. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208 (1882) (“Under
our system the people, who are there [in England] called subjects, are the sovereign.”).
9. The ratification statements of all thirteen original states recite that the ratification is
on behalf of the people of the state, not the state. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1787-1870, at 25 (1894) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (Delaware); id. at 44 (Pennsylvania); id. at 61 (New Jersey); id. at
83 (Georgia); id. at 87 (Connecticut); id. at 93 (Massachusetts); id. at 121 (Maryland); id. at
138 (South Carolina); id. at 144 (New Hampshire); id. at 144–45 (Virginia); id. at 190 (New
York); id. at 290 (North Carolina); id. at 310 (Rhode Island). Chief Justice Marshall, who
was a member of the Virginia ratification convention, see CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN,
MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO
SEPTEMBER 1787, at 297 (1966), took great pains to emphasize this critical distinction in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403–04 (1819):
The powers of the general government, it has been said, are delegated by the
states, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination to the
states, who alone possess supreme dominion. It would be difficult to sustain this
proposition. The convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by
the state legislatures. But the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a
mere proposal, without obligation, or pretensions to it. . . .
[T]he people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It
required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the state governments.
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discussing the origin of states’ sovereign immunity, however, Justice
Holmes misunderstood that relationship:
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a
sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has
been public property since before the days of Hobbes. . . . A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. 11

Holmes failed to realize that the United States did not make the
Constitution; the Constitution made the United States. 12 That sequence is
critical to understanding the proper relationship of the government to its
charter.
Holmes’s statement is irrelevant to whether the federal
government, the states, or either’s agents are subject to suit for
constitutional violations. The former colonists did not create the nation on
the theory of Hobbes, 13 but rather on that of Locke, who viewed the people,
Id. at 402–04. In his book written nearly 200 years later, Justice Breyer emphasizes the
same theme. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 122
(2010). Justice Souter has also emphasized this point in the context of states’ amenability to
suit on federal claims:
[R]atification demonstrated that state governments were subject to a superior
regime of law in a judicial system established, not by the State, but by the people
through a specific delegation of their sovereign power to a National Government
that was paramount within its delegated sphere. When individuals sued States to
enforce federal rights, the Government that corresponded to the “sovereign” in the
traditional common law sense was not the State but the National Government, and
any state immunity from the jurisdiction of the Nation’s courts would have
required a grant from the true sovereign, the people, in their Constitution, or from
the Congress that the Constitution had empowered.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 153–54 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). State
immunity to federal law or federal claims turns the Supremacy Clause on its head. Had the
Framers contemplated such immunity, they would have recreated the very kind of central
government inefficacy that destroyed the Articles of Confederation. If the states were to
remain immune from federal power, the Framers need not have been in Philadelphia at all.
10. Professor Dworkin criticized this notion “that the ‘people’ are sovereign” as
“mean[ing] almost nothing.” RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 18 (1978). I
see it slightly differently from Professor Dworkin: I think it means almost everything.
11. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). Justice Holmes repeated that
idea in The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922): “[W]e must realize that the authority that
makes the law is itself superior to it, and that if it consents to apply to itself the rules that it
applies to others the consent is free and may be withheld.” Id. at 432. That may be true with
respect to a statute passed by the legislature, but it cannot apply to a constitutional right
established by the people. Congress can enact laws that do not allow recovery against the
federal government for violations of them. Government liability founded upon a statute
rather than the Constitution is different. Congress lacks the power to exempt the government
or its agents from constitutional obedience.
12. Cf. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1963) (“[Holmes’s] theory, even if analytically possible, clearly does
not express either the moral or psychological premises of the Middle Ages. Nor does it
adequately account for the law as it existed when he wrote, or as it exists today.”).
13. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Oxford Univ. Press 1909) (1651).
Hobbes’s Leviathan was an absolute ruler, who “knows no terms, limits or conditions, and
. . . recognizes no other source of authority.” DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
OR THE RULE OF LAW: THE NEW FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 26 (2005).
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not the government, as sovereign. 14 Whereas Hobbes and Filmer 15 saw
creation of the civil state as the people’s irrevocable alienation of
sovereignty, Locke characterized legitimate government as trustee of the
people’s sovereign power, which they could withdraw if government
breached the trust. The idea that a government—created by the people
through a constitution—could exempt itself from obedience to or liability
under that constitution would have struck Locke as both laughable and
It would have been the antithesis of
extraordinarily menacing. 16
government by consent, which lay at the heart of Locke’s philosophy.17
The cognitive dissonance would have been unbearable (as it should be
today). The government was supposed to be the people’s trustee, not their
master.
Why should anyone have thought sovereign immunity was consistent
with the American constitutional system? The Constitution has only two
purposes: to create government and to restrain it. Sovereign immunity,
however, permits the government to cast off the Constitution’s restraints
with impunity. It demonstrates that government is not subject to the law. It
violates Article VI’s declaration that “[t]his Constitution . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land,” 18 by placing government conduct beyond the
reach of that “supreme law.” In Locke’s terms, it permits the trustee to
violate the terms of the trust. Perhaps the strangest thing about sovereign
immunity in America is that it imports the monarchical model of
government that the colonists fought a war to throw off.
What is worse, the model does not even properly reflect English practice.
English legal history is replete with instances of individuals obtaining relief
against wrongs done in the name of the Crown:
Magna Carta ma[de] clear that early thirteenth-century English society
expected the king and all his officers to act consistently with the law of
the land, and it provided a remedy for their failure to do so.

14. See DOERNBERG, supra note 13, at 63–70. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1963) (1690).
15. See generally ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS (Johann P.
Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680).
16. This also demonstrates the weakness of Justice Holmes’s statement. Jean Bodin was
the first political thinker to articulate the idea of a single, immutable power source, see
generally JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY (Julian H. Franklin ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1992) (1576), and Hobbes further elaborated that view, see generally HOBBES, supra note 13.
The point upon which Justice Holmes relied is precisely the concept that the colonists
rejected by adopting Locke’s theory.
17. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. VIII, § 95 (1690),
reprinted in LOCKE, supra note 14, at 283, 365 (“Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all
free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the
Political Power of another, without his own Consent. The only way whereby any one divests
himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with
other Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable
living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security
against any that are not of it. . . . When any number of Men have so consented to make one
Community or Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body
Politick, wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest.”).
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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Representative lords were entitled to petition the king for redress and, if
the king failed to make good the wrong done, were entitled to raise the
populace against him to secure redress. Although the king’s and his
family’s persons were inviolate, royal property was not. 19

During the reign of Edward I, the aggrieved subject could petition the
King for relief. The ability to sue the Crown was “an uncontested point.”20
Under the legal theory of the day, such suits depended on the King’s
consent: “The petition of right asked the Crown to submit itself to the laws
that applied to private persons. With the standard notation, ‘Let right be
done,’ the King usually endorsed such petitions.” 21
“[U]sually” is particularly important in English law. After all, the
English Constitution is unwritten; it is the collection of governmental
powers, limitations, and practices that have accumulated over the
centuries. 22 Where custom was the law, the king’s practice of “seldom
openly defy[ing] a request for justice simply on the ground that he had the
power to do what he pleased” meant English law provided remedies for
wrongs done in the King’s name. 23 So, merely to state that the government
is not suable without its consent, as Hamilton24 and Madison 25 did, strips
the theory from historical practice.26 In England, consent was routinely
forthcoming.
19. DOERNBERG, supra note 13, at 71 (citing MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 1215),
translated and reprinted in JAMES C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA app. 6, at 448, 471 (2d ed.
1992)).
20. Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriation Power and Sovereign Immunity,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (2009).
21. Id. at 1213. The phrase used was “soit fait droit.” Ludwik Ehrlich, Proceedings
Against the Crown (1216–1377), in 6 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY pt.
XII, at 97 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1921).
22. See, e.g., Jack Beatson, Reforming an Unwritten Constitution, 126 LAW Q. REV. 48,
48 (2010) (“It differs from many others in not being embodied in a written document but in a
complex mixture of institutional practices; that is, of history, custom, tradition, and politics
reflected in conventions, procedures, and protocols as well as within the body of statute and
common law.”).
23. Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 26. Remedies lay for disseisin, for a “wrong inflicted by a
sheriff, or a bailiff, or even the exchequer” by summoning the derelict official before the
exchequer for an inquiry into the lawfulness of his behavior, which might result in an order
to desist. Id. at 28.
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548–49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind;
and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government
of every state in the union.”). Hamilton, however, did not address the question of where
sovereignty itself (as distinguished from its attributes) lies in the United States.
25. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881) (recording Madison’s
argument at the Virginia ratifying convention that the Constitution did not give any
individual the right “to call any state into court”).
26. See WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 251
(London, W. Green 1817) (1783) (“In the British, and possibly in all other constitutions,
there exists a wide difference between the actual state of the government and the theory.
The one results from the other; but still they are different. When we contemplate the theory
of the British government, we see the king invested with the most absolute personal
impunity . . . . Yet, when we turn our attention from the legal existence, to the actual
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B. Sovereign Immunity in the United States
It is therefore too facile simply to assert that sovereign immunity was the
rule without looking at the practice.27 The norm in England was that some
form of remedy existed. 28 Thus, sovereign immunity in the United States
suffers ultimately from three defects: (1) it misidentifies the sovereign in a
way that repudiates the political philosophy that underlay the American
revolution, (2) it borrows an English monarchical model of government,
and (3) it fails even to borrow the model correctly.
Irrespective of its philosophical and political illegitimacy, the concept of
sovereign immunity has long roots in the United States. In United States v.
Lee, 29 referring to Chief Justice Marshall’s unquestioning recognition of
that principle,30 the Supreme Court noted that such immunity “has always
been treated as an established doctrine” even though “the principle has
never been discussed or the reasons for it given.” 31 There is good reason
that it had never been discussed: the political philosophy of sovereign
immunity did not transfer to the United States. Pretending that it did
ignores the English practice of several hundred years and imposes the
mistake on the American constitutional system. Lee cautioned against
relying heavily on English sovereign immunity precedent for two reasons.
First, English courts at law had little opportunity to address the issue
because of the effectiveness of the alternative petition of right. 32 Second,
“of much greater weight,” was “the vast difference in the essential character
of the two governments as regards the source and depositaries of power.”33
Having expounded the lack of a philosophical foundation for English
exercise of royal authority in England, we see these formidable prerogatives dwindled into
mere ceremonies . . . .”).
27. Ironically, this calls to mind Justice Holmes’s famous aphorism: “The life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAW 1 (1881). Holmes’s further explanation that “the prevalent moral and political theories”
and “the story of a nation’s development” often “had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed” was equally revealing.
Id.
28. The remedy was not always in the form of damages. The struggle for financial
supremacy between king and parliament routinely left the king short of cash. See generally
Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1217–29 (discussing the struggle and how it ended “‘in
favour of parliamentary supremacy’”) (quoting E.A. Reitan, The Civil List in EighteenthCentury British Politics: Parliamentary Supremacy Versus the Independence of the Crown,
9 HIST. J. 318, 337 (1966)). Therefore, where equitable relief was not possible, the practice
was for the king to make a non-monetary grant of some sort to the wronged subject, whether
of “land, avowdsons, liberties, [or] rights to hold markets; in short, anything rather than hard
cash.” Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 32.
29. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
30. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821) (“This general
proposition [sovereign immunity] will not be controverted.”).
31. Lee, 106 U.S. at 207 (citing Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 380).
32. Id. at 208. Lee noted that the petition of right often eliminated the need to sue
Crown officials, id., because the Crown was the deep pocket. Eight decades before Lee,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), had noted, “In Great Britain the king
himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the
judgment of his court.” Id. at 163.
33. Lee, 106 U.S. at 208.

450

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

sovereign immunity in the United States, where no person exercises full
sovereign power, 34 Lee nonetheless implicitly relied on that theory. It
concluded that, there being no sovereign executive power, only Congress
could consent to suit against the federal government. 35 It borrowed the
principle without the principal upon whom it depended, importing
sovereign immunity without its corresponding remedial system.
Professor Louis Jaffe commented extensively on what one might call the
myth of sovereign immunity:
Perhaps the question has been not whether the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was “right” but whether as a practical matter it ever has existed.
From time immemorial many claims affecting the Crown could be
pursued in the regular courts if they did not take the form of a suit against
the Crown. And when it was necessary to sue the Crown eo nomine
consent apparently was given as of course. Long before 1789 it was true
that sovereign immunity was not a bar to relief. Where the doctrine was
in form applicable the subject had to proceed by petition of right, a
cumbersome, dilatory remedy to be sure, but nevertheless a remedy. If
the subject was the victim of illegal official action, in many cases he
could sue the King’s officers for damages. And the writs of certiorari,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus ran against many official
boards and commissions, though until recent times we do not find cases
where they have run against the King’s high secretaries of state. This was
the situation in England at the time the American Constitution was
drafted. 36

In what Professor Jaffe termed “a magnificent irony,” 37 the new
American states believed that in the absence of an individual sovereign,
consent to suit was not possible as it had been under the Crown. Therefore,
the power to consent passed mystically to the state and federal legislatures,
which took “many years to authorize suit.” 38
The irony is greater than Professor Jaffe imagined. The most important
cause of the American Revolution was the colonists’ belief that England
was denying them the rights of Englishmen. All of their other grievances
resembled a bill of particulars explicating that general dissatisfaction.39
34. See id. at 206 (“As no person in this government exercises supreme executive power,
or performs the public duties of a sovereign, it is difficult to see on what solid foundation of
principle the exemption from liability to suit rests.”).
35. Id. at 205–06. It may have been this sort of reasoning that caused Professor Davis to
remark that “[h]ardly any other branch of Supreme Court law is so permeated with sophistry
as the law of sovereign immunity.” KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 27.04,
at 501 (3d ed. 1972).
36. Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1–2 (second emphasis added).
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 35.
39. See PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776, at 245 (1972) (noting
James Madison’s hope in 1774 that “a ‘Bill of Rights’ might be adopted by Congress and
confirmed by the King or Parliament, such that America’s liberties would be ‘as firmly
fixed, and defined as those of England were at the [glorious] revolution.’” (quoting Letter
from James Madison to William Bradford (Aug. 1, 1774), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 118 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. Rachel eds., 1962)). Madison’s
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Yet, the American form of sovereign immunity created a system of official
accountability even less protective of individual rights vis-à-vis government
than the English system the colonists had thrown off because it denied them
those rights. 40
Although Alexander Hamilton endorsed sovereign immunity in one of
his Federalist papers, 41 he had said something quite different in another,
published only a few days earlier, when discussing constitutional
supremacy:
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every
act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under
which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act therefore contrary to the
constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy
is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the
representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that
men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not
authorise, but what they forbid. 42

This statement, often cited as supporting judicial review,43 also
powerfully reflects John Locke’s influence: (1) the United States
comment underscores the colonists’ feeling that England was denying them the fundamental
rights of Englishmen:
Whether the Crown could—or could not—alter colonial rights and privileges
established through usage and founded on either custom or the colonists’ inherited
rights as English people was certainly the most divisive issue separating
metropolis and colonies during the seven decades following the Glorious
Revolution. That issue was at the heart of the recurring controversies over the
applicability of English law in the colonies and the status of the colonial
assemblies.
JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 18 (2011).
40. See, e.g., Onuf, supra note 4, at x (describing “rebellious colonists who had taken up
arms to vindicate their rights as Englishmen and who hoped to redeem their mother country
and its empire from corruption and incipient despotism.”). In fact, the colonists originally
took to arms to regain their English rights, rather than to create new rights protected by a
new American government. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 17–30 (1997) (describing the repeatedly expressed desire of
the colonists to mend relations with England rather than separate from it); Onuf, supra note
4, at x (“The colonists originally resorted to violence because they were Britons, not because
they were ‘Americans.’”); see also GREENE, supra note 39, at 8 (“For English people
migrating overseas to establish new communities of settlement, the capacity to enjoy—to
possess—the English system of law and liberty was thus crucial to their ability to maintain
their identity as English people and to continue to think of themselves and be thought of as
English. . . . ‘[T]he attempt to establish English law and the rights and liberties of
Englishmen was constant from the first settlement to the [American] Revolution’ and
beyond.” (quoting GEORGE DARGO, ROOTS OF THE REPUBLIC: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EARLY
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 58 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
41. See supra note 24.
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 24, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton). It seems a fair
inference that Hamilton would have applied this reasoning to the other two branches of
government as well.
43. See, e.g., Jack Wade Nowlin, Conceptualizing the Dangers of the “Least
Dangerous” Branch: A Typology of Judicial Constitutional Violation, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1211, 1218 (2007) (referring to Hamilton’s defense of judicial review as “canonical”);
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkrantz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1221
n.32 (2010).
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government possesses only delegated, not inherent, power; (2) the
government can never legitimately violate the Constitution; and (3) the
government is the deputy—the servant—of the people. Had Hamilton said
“trustee” 44 instead of “servant,” he might have been accused of plagiarizing
Locke. 45
When the Constitutional Convention met, the maxim ubi jus ibi
remedium reigned. 46 Chief Justice Marshall went out of his way to make
that point in Marbury v. Madison. 47 First, he quoted Blackstone: “‘[I]t is a
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.’”48
Then, he penned one of the most famous lines in American jurisprudence:
“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested
legal right.” 49 It is senseless to speak of a right for which there is no
remedy. 50 Yet, the effect of an immunity is “freedom from the legal power
or ‘control’ of another as regards some legal relation.” 51 Thus, immunities
insulate one from the law’s remedy. If there is no remedy, there is no right;

44. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
45. Jefferson had suffered that exact accusation after writing the Declaration of
Independence. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1823), in 3
The REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES
MADISON 1776–1826, at 1875, 1876 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (“Richard Henry Lee
charged it as copied from Locke’s treatise on government.”). Jefferson denied it in a letter to
Madison: “I know only that I turned to neither book or pamphlet while writing it.” Id.
46. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 24, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is
essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty
or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the
resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will in fact amount to nothing more than
advice or recommendation.”). Hamilton also noted that without effective remedies for
violations of the law, everything would devolve to the “execution by the sword.” Id. “Such a
state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent
man choose to commit his happiness to it.” Id. at 96.
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
48. Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23).
49. Id. The idea was certainly not original with Marshall; Chief Justice Holt of the
King’s bench had expressed the same thought a century earlier:
If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and
maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and
indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for . . . want of right
and want of remedy are reciprocal.
Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.) 136; 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953.
50. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 207 (9th ed. 1952) (“The proclamation in a constitution or charter of the right
to personal freedom, or indeed of any other right, gives of itself but slight security that the
right has more than a nominal existence, and students who wish to know how far the right to
freedom of person is in reality part of the law of the constitution must consider both what is
the meaning of the right and, a matter of even more consequence, what are the legal methods
by which its exercise is secured.”).
51. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913).

2011]

TAKING SUPREMACY SERIOUSLY

453

there is merely a hope, wish, or aspiration. 52 In the context of the present
discussion, sovereign immunities grant the government “freedom from the
legal power or ‘control’ of” 53 the Constitution, the document designed both
to create and to control that government. The Constitution’s recognition of
individual “rights” against the power of the government becomes a hollow
mockery.
II. OFFICIAL AND MUNICIPAL IMMUNITIES
A. English Practice
And what of the King’s officials? The well-known but oft-misconstrued
phrase “the King can do no wrong” controlled their liability:
[O]riginally [it] meant precisely the contrary to what it later came to
mean. “[I]t meant that the king must not, was not allowed, not entitled, to
do wrong . . . .” It was on that basis that the King, though not suable in
his court (since it seemed an anomaly to issue a writ against oneself),
nevertheless endorsed on petitions “let justice be done,” thus empowering
his courts to proceed. 54

Accordingly, no wrongful act by a Crown official was attributable to the
King. 55 If the King’s official committed a tort, it was no defense that he
Feather v. The Queen 57 cemented that
acted for the Crown. 56

52. See generally Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 677–78 (1987).
53. Hohfeld, supra note 51, at 55.
54. Jaffe, supra note 12, at 4 (second alteration in original) (quoting Erlich, supra note
21, at 42); see also James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward
a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 899, 901 (1997) (pointing out that Blackstone described this petition process).
Professor Pfander quotes Blackstone’s elaboration of the phrase, which bears repeating:
“That the king can do no wrong, is a necessary and fundamental principle of the
English constitution: meaning only, . . . that in the first place, whatever may be
amiss in the conduct of public affairs is not chargeable personally on the king . . . ;
and, secondly, that the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury . . . .
Whenever therefore it happens, that, by misinformation or inadvertence, the crown
hath been induced to invade the private rights of any of its subjects, though no
action will lie against the sovereign, . . . yet the law hath furnished the subject with
a decent and respectful mode of removing that invasion, by informing the king of
the true state of the matter in dispute: and, as it presumes that to know of an injury
and to redress it are inseparable in the royal breast, it then issues as of course, in
the king’s own name, his orders to his judges to do justice to the party aggrieved.”
Id. at 901 n.6 (alterations in original) (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 48, at *254–55).
55. DICEY, supra note 50, at 25 (“[N]o one can plead the orders of the Crown or indeed
of any superior officer in defence of any act not otherwise justifiable by law . . . .”).
56. 6 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 266–67 (1927) (“It was
well recognized that no tort could be imputed to the crown, because the king could do no
wrong. It was also fully recognized after the [Glorious] Revolution [of 1689] that all
servants of the crown were personally responsible for torts committed by them, even though
they had been in fact committed on the instructions of the crown.”). This is reminiscent of
the construction of the Fourth Amendment that the defendants in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), unsuccessfully urged
on the Court, which Justice Brennan’s majority opinion summarized this way:
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understanding, 58 but long before that, Crown officials who violated the law
were liable in tort. For example, “[a]s against sheriffs and inferior
ministers, persons who claimed to be wrongly imprisoned had the remedies
of de homine replegiando (to secure release) or false imprisonment (to
recover damages).” 59
Magna Carta and its requirement of adherence to the “law of the land”60
gave rise to those rules. 61 Sir Edward Coke traced the condemnation of
misuse of official power to that document: “[I]f any man by colour of any
authority, where he hath not any in that particular case, arrest, or imprison
any man, or cause him to be arrested, or imprisoned, this is against this Act,
and it is most hatefull, when it is done by countenance of Justice.”62 He
emphasized that Magna Carta was supreme law and other laws had to be
consistent with it, as the Crown had recognized.63
B. American Practice
The Constitution does establish one official immunity. The Speech and
Debate Clause 64 immunizes members of Congress with respect to
legislative activities. 65 The Constitution prescribes no other official
[T]he Fourth Amendment would serve merely to limit the extent to which the
agents could defend the state law tort suit by asserting that their actions were a
valid exercise of federal power: if the agents were shown to have violated the
Fourth Amendment, such a defense would be lost to them and they would stand
before the state law merely as private individuals.
Id. at 390–91.
57. (1865) 122 Eng. Rep. 1191 (Q.B.); 6 B. & S. 257.
58. Id. at 1205; 6 B. & S. at 296 (“As the Sovereign cannot authorize wrong to be done,
the authority of the Crown would afford no defence to an action brought for an illegal act
committed by an officer of the Crown.”).
59. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 473 (4th ed. 2002).
60. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (Eng. 1215), translated and reprinted in HOLT, supra note 19,
app. 6, at 461.
61. One is apt to think of Magna Carta in constitutional terms, but it is not the British
Constitution, although many of the ideas contained within it are part of the British
Constitution and, according to Sir Edward Coke, even antedate Magna Carta. EDWARD
COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1642), reprinted in
2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 745, 750 (Steve Sheppard
ed., 2003) (referring to Magna Carta and other documents of agreement between the
monarch and the lords as “for the most part, but declaratories of the ancient Common Laws
of England, to the observation, and keeping whereof, the King was bound and sworn.”). The
American concept of due process of law and many other rights in the Constitution trace back
to Magna Carta’s words. In examining Magna Carta’s language, Coke noted that “[u]pon
this Chapter, as out of a roote, many fruitful branches of the Law of England have sprung,”
id. at 848, including the rights of due process of law, see id. at 849, trial by jury, id. at 849,
854–55, 857, indictment or presentment, id. at 858, and confrontation, id. at 856. All of
these rights became part of the American Bill of Rights. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
This is hardly surprising since the critical issue that drove the colonies away from England
was whether the colonists had all the rights of Englishmen residing in England or whether
the Crown had acquired greater prerogative with respect to them than it had over its
domestic subjects. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
62. COKE, supra note 61, at 867.
63. See id. at 867–70.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
65. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501, 507–08 (1975).
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immunity. 66 Referring to legislative immunity, Tenney v. Brandhove67
noted that “[t]he provision in the United States Constitution was a reflection
of political principles already firmly established in the states,”68 and traced
it to “taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries.” 69 One might have expected, if official immunities
generally were well established, that the Framers would have included them
in the Constitution as well. They did not, however, and the question is why
not. There are several possibilities.
First, immunities might have been so well established that the Framers
felt no need to include them. If the other immunities did exist at common
law, and the Framers intended to leave them in place, that raises the
uncomfortable question of why the Framers picked out one immunity for
explicit constitutional protection and left the others unstated. That flies in
the face of the well-known maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 70
and there is no reason to believe that the Framers abandoned such
reasoning.
The Necessary and Proper Clause 71 and the Ninth
Amendment 72 implicitly recognize the maxim. The former specifies that
the enumeration of congressional powers in Article I is not exclusive; the
latter does the same with respect to the enumeration of rights in the first
eight Amendments. 73
66. The only suggestion that sovereign immunity has other textual roots in the
Constitution has come from Professors Figley and Tidmarsh. See generally Figley &
Tidmarsh, supra note 20. They argued that the Appropriations Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 7, provides the constitutional underpinning for sovereign immunity because
Congress, by refusing to appropriate money to satisfy a judgment, would effectively make
the government immune, see Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1259. I see it differently.
Congress’s refusal would repudiate the rule of law and implicitly deny the federal judiciary’s
power to adjudicate constitutional questions, all of which involve the power, prerogative,
and behavior of government. When the Framers drafted the Appropriations Clause, they
sought to keep power out of the hands of the executive branch, not to immunize the
government from constitutional obedience. See id. at 1210 (“[T]he Clause was a political
given. Its ‘power of the purse’ was intended as the counterweight to the President’s ‘power
of the sword.’”). Professors Figley and Tidmarsh assert that “[i]t is only a small, and logical,
step from constitutionally commanded legislative control over disbursements from the purse
to constitutionally commanded legislative control over private claims against the purse.” Id.
at 1259. That conclusion rests on an unspoken and unsupportable premise: that Congress
can create sovereign immunity by simply refusing to appropriate money to pay judgments
supposes that Congress will refuse to recognize judicial determination of individuals’
constitutional rights. Congress thus would become complicit in the executive branch’s
violation. The Constitution, however, gives individuals rights against government. Those
rights bind the government—the entire government, including Congress. Professors Figley
and Tidmarsh’s interpretation of the Appropriations Clause makes individuals’ constitutional
rights subordinate to Congress in all matters having to do with federal money. I submit that
it is a very large and illogical step.
67. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
68. Id. at 373.
69. Id. at 372.
70. “A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
72. Id. amend. IX.
73. The prevalence of the kind of legal thinking that expressio unius est exclusio alterius
exemplifies caused objection in the Constitutional Convention when it discussed a bill of

456

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Second, immunities might have been well established, but the Framers
deliberately omitted all but legislative immunity from the Constitution.
Perhaps the common law immunities existed, and the Framers decided to
exclude them and retain only the legislative immunity that English law had
codified. 74 Although they did not specify that they were abandoning them,
codifying bodies do not commonly mention rules or principles that they are
not adopting. Remember that the Constitution is a document of enumerated
powers and mandated restrictions. It contains nothing like a reception
provision, and there is no federal reception statute. Federal law began with
the Constitution, and all federal law flows from it. 75
Third, the immunity principles (that the Supreme Court assumes) may
not have existed at all.76 Although the Court keeps asserting that these
immunities existed, they may not have. That is consistent with the
Constitution’s specification of only legislators’ immunity. The English had
explicitly established it nearly a century earlier.77
The Supreme Court has adopted the first possibility, which seems the
least plausible. Notably, it has not accorded constitutional status to any of
the immunities it has recognized. 78 Instead, it has reasoned backward from
a cost-benefit analysis to the unsupported assumption that the Framers
intended to retain such immunities.79 This undisguised, self-proclaimed
utilitarian analysis causes some individual constitutional rights to be
unenforceable when government violates them.
Such results are
irreconcilable with constitutional supremacy:
The prospect of utilitarian gains cannot justify preventing a man from
doing what he has a right to do, and the supposed gains in respect for law
rights. The concern was that having the Constitution explicitly guarantee some rights would
imply that the list was exclusive. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
74. See An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the
Succession of the Crown, 1688, 1 W. & M., 2d Sess., c. 2, § 9 (Eng.).
75. One must take that sentence literally. Under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842), the federal courts routinely applied principles of “general law,” a form of common
law based upon a natural-law conception of law. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938), overruled Swift, recognizing the shift in jurisprudential thinking from the naturallaw model to a positivist model: “There is no federal general common law.” Id. at 78. The
Court made clear that the common law the federal courts had declared and applied under the
Swift regime could not have been federal law within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause
when it complained that “[p]ersistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of
common law prevented uniformity.” Id. at 74 (footnote omitted). If the general common law
the federal judiciary had announced had been federal law, the states would have been
obliged to follow it, achieving the federal/state uniformity of which Justice Brandeis
wistfully spoke. See generally Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad:
Why History and Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109
W. VA. L. REV. 611 (2007).
76. Given the antebellum history of suits against government officials, this is the most
probable explanation. See generally James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs
and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862 (2010).
77. See supra note 74.
78. See infra notes 102–20 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text; see also supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
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are simply utilitarian gains. There would be no point in the boast that we
respect individual rights unless that involved some sacrifice, and the
sacrifice in question must be that we give up whatever marginal benefits
our country would receive from overriding these rights when they prove
inconvenient. 80

The Court superimposes its cost-benefit balance on the Bill of Rights and
some of the amendments that have followed it, notably the Civil War
Amendments. That ignores the balance the Supremacy Clause has already
struck. If the Court had construed constitutional rights more narrowly than
plaintiffs wished—simply not to reach the challenged conduct—then its
results would at least have the veneer of constitutional respectability. 81 But
it has not done that.
Kendall v. Stokes, 82 an early official immunity case, discusses immunity
entirely in conclusory terms. “We are not aware of any case in England or
in this country in which it has been held that a public officer, acting to the
best of his judgment and from a sense of duty, in a matter of account with
an individual, has been held liable to an action for an error of judgment.”83
The Court articulated no policy, referring only to the “greatest mischiefs”84
that would attend the contrary rule. It cited Gidley v. Palmerston, 85 an
English case that declared that well-qualified people would decline public
service if individual liability on contracts entered into on behalf of the
government might follow. 86 Gidley, however, did not regard plaintiffs as
remediless; the Crown supplied a remedy in the form of the petition of
right. 87 Furthermore, Gidley was an assumpsit action, involving the
government’s obligation to pay a pension that Parliament had allotted to
military retirees, and the case it relied on was also a contract case.88 The
American official immunities cases do not sound in contract; they are in the
nature of tort founded on constitutional rights. Nonetheless, they have
borrowed heavily from the English contract cases.

80. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 193.
81. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695–96, 701, 710 (1976) (disallowing a
§ 1983 action seeking damages for a police flyer labeling plaintiff as a known shoplifter,
even though he had no shoplifting conviction, because the Court found no Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest in reputation alone, without any attendant loss of property, right,
or privilege).
82. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845).
83. Id. at 97–98.
84. Id. at 98.
85. (1822) 129 Eng. Rep. 1290 (C.P.); 3 Brod & B. 275; see Kendall, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
at 98 (citing Gidley, 129 Eng. Rep. 1290; 3 Brod & B. 275).
86. See Gidley, 129 Eng. Rep. at 1294–95 & n.a; 3 Brod & B. at 286 & n.a (“‘No man
would accept of any office of trust under government upon such conditions . . . .” (quoting
Macbeath v. Haldimand, (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B.) 1041; 1 T.R. 172, 181–82)).
87. Id. (“[N]o individual is answerable for any engagements which he enters into on [the
government’s] behalf. There is no doubt but the crown will do ample justice to the plaintiffs
demands, if they be well founded.”).
88. It is significant that Gidley rested on utilitarian, not constitutional, grounds. See infra
notes 102–32 and accompanying text.
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Wilkes v. Dinsman 89 sounded in tort, 90 and the Court’s discussion of the
protection available to the defendant is illuminating both for what it said
and what it did not say. Dinsman was a marine retained beyond the original
ending date of his enlistment, pursuant to a statute. 91 When Dinsman
refused to perform his duties, Wilkes punished him by lashes and
imprisonment, as authorized by military law. 92 Dinsman asserted claims of
trespass vi et armis, assault, battery, and false imprisonment, some of it in a
foreign jail. 93 His only constitutional claim was an Eighth Amendment
claim with respect to the foreign confinement. 94 In a tort case between
private individuals, the plaintiff states a prima facie case by introducing
proof of “acts of violence,” after which “the person using them must go
forward next, and show the moderation or justification of the blows
used.” 95 A case against a public official invested with discretion, the Court
noted, was entirely different:
[T]he officer, being intrusted with a discretion for public purposes, is not
to be punished for the exercise of it, unless it is first proved against him,
either that he exercised the power confided in cases without his
jurisdiction, or in a manner not confided to him, as with malice, cruelty,
or wilful oppression, or, in the words of Lord Mansfield, . . . that he
exercised it as “if the heart is wrong.” In short, it is not enough to show
he committed an error in judgment, but it must have been a malicious and
wilful error. 96

This is immunity but far more limited than the Supreme Court
recognizes. It amounts to good faith immunity—a concept the Court toyed
with in Wood v. Strickland 97 and abandoned in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,98
89. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849).
90. See id. at 122.
91. See id. at 122, 124.
92. See id. at 127.
93. See id. at 122; see also id. at 89.
94. See id. at 114–15.
95. Id. at 130.
96. Id. at 130–31 (quoting Wall v. McNamara, (1779) (original not available), quoted in
Hannaford v. Hunn, (1825) 172 Eng. Rep. 68 (K.B.) 72 note; 2 Car. & P. 148, 158 note).
97. 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (“A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the
school board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such
disregard of the student’s clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot
reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.”). Wood announced a standard with both
subjective and objective components. See id. at 322 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
557 (1967)) (holding that there was no immunity where a school board member “knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other
injury to the student”).
98. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow represents a considerable shift in Justice Powell’s
perspective. In Wood, he disliked the objective component of the majority’s standard. He
thought the majority’s reliance on terms like “settled, indisputable law,” Wood, 420 U.S. at
321, and “basic, unquestioned constitutional rights,” id. at 322, was unrealistic. “One need
only look to the decisions of this Court—to our reversals, our recognition of evolving
concepts, and our five-to-four splits—to recognize the hazard of even informed prophecy as
to what are ‘unquestioned constitutional rights.’” Id. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). In 1975, Justice Powell favored a good faith standard. “[A]s I view
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where it instead allowed an immunity defense except in cases involving
violations of “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” 99
Consider the rationale supporting official immunities. Sovereign
immunity springs from a theory of government power, 100 however
it, the correct standard for qualified immunity of a government official [is]: whether in light
of the discretion and responsibilities of his office, and under all of the circumstances as they
appeared at the time, the officer acted reasonably and in good faith.” Id. at 330. By the time
he wrote Harlow seven years later, Justice Powell had entirely reversed his field:
[W]e conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18. He did not explain the apparent Damascus conversion that
occurred on the road from Wood to Harlow. The primary effect of the shift, removing the
element of good faith from the equation, was to deny plaintiffs discovery with respect to the
defending official’s state of mind by making it irrelevant. This was a startling reversal of
both the English immunity rule, see supra note 96 and accompanying text, and the American
practice as described in Dinsman, see supra notes 89–97 and accompanying text. Harlow
may be doubly surprising because there was evidence of bad faith on the part of one of the
defendants. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 735–36 (1982) (quoting from an internal
memorandum indicating that the White House should not rehire Fitzgerald, despite his “topnotch” skills, but instead “should let him bleed, for a while at least” because he had “very
low marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game.”).
99. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997),
unanimously declared that Harlow intended “to give officials (and, ultimately, governments)
the same protection from civil liability and its consequences that individuals have
traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes.” Id. at 270–71. The Sixth
Circuit had reversed convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006), the criminal counterpart to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), holding that (1) only Supreme Court declarations of the
constitutional rights that statute protects give sufficient clarity to avert a void-for-vagueness
ruling, and (2) the charge against the defendant must rest on facts fundamentally similar to
the Supreme Court precedents. United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1392–93 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 520 U.S. 259 (1997). By vacating and remanding,
the Supreme Court gave the criminal statute broader scope than had the Sixth Circuit. “The
question is whether this standard of notice is higher than the Constitution requires, and we
hold that it is.” Lanier, 520 U.S. at 261.
Five years later, it relied on Lanier and issued a similar ruling with respect to
qualified immunity in civil suits under Harlow’s standard. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
739–41 (2002). Yet, in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), the Court required
fundamentally similar—almost identical—facts to overcome the official’s claim of qualified
immunity to civil damages. Id. at 640–41 (reversing the circuit court’s erroneous refusal “to
consider the argument that it was not clearly established that the circumstances with which
Anderson was confronted did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances” even
though “it was firmly established that warrantless searches not supported by probable cause
and exigent circumstances violate the Fourth Amendment” (second emphasis added)).
Although Creighton antedated Pelzer, the Court returned to the fact-specific Creighton
approach in Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004), two years after Pelzer: “It is
important to emphasize that this inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context
of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (quoting Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)). Saucier also relied specifically on Creighton. See
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201–02 (citing Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640). Accordingly, there is a
plausible argument that officials faced with possible civil liability for constitutional
violations get more protection than they would if faced with criminal charges for the same
violations.
100. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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inapplicable it may be to the United States.101 That is not true for official
immunities. None rest on political or constitutional philosophy. They rest
on arguments like the government-function or over-deterred-officials
arguments, discussed below. All are theories of expediency; 102 the Court
engages openly and unashamedly in cost-benefit analysis. In Professor
Dworkin’s terms, arguments of policy try to overcome arguments of
principle. 103 According to Professor Tribe, arguments of policy generally
triumph because the Court’s incomplete cost-benefit analysis fails to
allocate value to constitutionalism itself. 104 This balancing approach
ignores the Supremacy Clause. The Constitution does not declare itself the
“supreme Law of the Land [unless the Supreme Court shall find that the
costs it exacts are too high compared with the benefits that it provides].”105
The Supremacy Clause is the balance. In official immunity cases, the Court
finds that balance inconvenient, so it removes the Constitution from the
balance in favor of the Justices’ parade of horribles.
1. The Government-Function Argument
The most common argument supporting official immunities—the
utilitarian argument that officials need to act without fear of civil liability if
they violate the Constitution 106—has always seemed to me one of those
arguments that makes sense, provided that one reads it quickly enough. Its
implications are remarkable. It suggests that government cannot function
unless its officers can act without consideration of the constitutionality of
their conduct. Were that true, it would be difficult to find a broader
statement of the failure of the American experiment of government under
law. Of course, the implication is hyperbole of the type often employed to
101. See supra notes 7–18 and accompanying text.
102. The government’s most recent Supreme Court argument in favor of official
immunity made that abundantly clear. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 16–18, Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No. 10-98), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-98.pdf.
103. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 90 (“Arguments of principle are arguments intended
to establish an individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a
collective goal. Principles are propositions that describe rights; policies are propositions that
describe goals.”).
104. Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 157–58 (1984) (“[I]n that kind of calculus,
the costs will always seem weightier than the benefits. The benefits will be elusive,
intangible, diffuse. Costs will be visible and concrete: ‘There he goes, getting away,
someone who committed a crime!’”). Professor Tribe wrote in response to the Court’s
analysis in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in which a divided Court ruled that
evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant is nonetheless admissible if the police
have made a “reasonable” mistake. Id. at 922–23; see Tribe, supra, at 157–58. His argument
applies just as well to any of the areas in which the Court recognizes official immunities. In
all of those cases, the Court balances constitutional entitlements against non-constitutional
considerations.
105. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
106. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–07, 814 (1982); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506–07, 512–16 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–
28 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318–21 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 241–42 (1974).
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make constitutional rights less effective or ineffective. For example,
consider the hostility to the exclusionary rule when the Court applied it to
the states in 1961. 107 The same sort of apocalyptic commotion followed
Miranda v. Arizona, 108 which many now regard as benign and some have
argued enhances the quality and effectiveness of law enforcement.109
When the Court announced Marbury, President Jefferson’s view was at
least hostile, and perhaps filled with foreboding. 110 Yet, the nation has
survived with judicial review, the exclusionary rule, and Miranda intact. 111
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein’s 112 discussion of absolute prosecutorial
immunity exemplifies both the Court’s parade of horribles technique and
subtle substitution of an ad hoc cost-benefit analysis, divorced from
constitutional considerations, for what should be a fundamental
constitutional debate. The unanimous Court invoked both the government107. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–57 (1961); Corinna Barrett Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1374 (2004) (“Not surprisingly, Mapp was
less than well received in certain quarters. Police across the country cried loudly in protest,
blaming the decision for a burglary wave in Minneapolis (which they later attributed to lack
of snow) and a decrease in narcotics convictions in New York. In their view, Mapp posed a
serious obstacle to law enforcement, one that the public might not be able to tolerate. Those
more solicitous of states’ rights than the Court found Mapp disturbing as well. The President
of the American Bar Association, for example, publicly criticized the Court for turning state
criminal law into ‘a mere appendage of [f]ederal constitutional law’ while giving ‘inordinate
weight’ to defendants’ rights. With comments like that, Mapp’s holding appeared to be as
controversial as it was consequential. Indeed, scholars have long regarded Mapp as one of
the two most unpopular criminal procedure decisions [with Miranda v. Arizona] in Supreme
Court history . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
108. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Interrogation and Silence: A
Comparative Study, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 271, 271–72 (2009) (“Initially, the political reaction
to Miranda in the United States (U.S.) was strong. At a time of rising crime rates, many
people complained that the Supreme Court was ‘handcuffing’ the police. In 1968, Congress
passed a statute attempting to overrule Miranda, an effort that the Supreme Court
condemned as unconstitutional in 2000.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Lain, supra note 107,
at 1399–1400. See generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 6–9, 184–85
(1970).
109. GRAHAM, supra note 108, at 7 (“[S]ome law enforcement officials say that the ruling
has improved law enforcement by making the police rely more on ‘hard’ evidence.”).
110. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 n.1, 311 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) (“[T]he
opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what
not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature &
Executive also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.”); see also G.
Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463,
1484–91 (2003) (discussing contemporary reactions to Marbury).
111. Some might argue that the Court’s decisions since the end of the Warren Court era
have substantially whittled away at the protection that Mapp and Miranda initially afforded
criminal defendants. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda
Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It—and What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
163, 178–84, 197–203 (2007) (canvassing the cases with which the Court has narrowed the
protection the Warren Court had intended Miranda to provide); Sean D. Doherty, Note, The
End of an Era: Closing the Exclusionary Debate Under Herring v. United States, 37
HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 845–53 (2009) (surveying the Court’s decisions weakening the
protection Mapp originally provided). I have no quarrel with that hypothesis, but discussion
of that history is beyond the scope of this Article.
112. 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009).
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function and the over-deterred-official 113 arguments. 114 It reiterated the
argument from Imbler v. Pachtman 115 that the public’s confidence in its
prosecutors will suffer if the public believes prosecutors make decisions
partly based on concern about subsequent civil suits by defendants claiming
constitutional violations.116 Curiously, the Court did not accord the
constitutional violations themselves any weight in the balance or think that
prosecutors would do so. 117 The Court aligned itself with the public and
the prosecutors: its concern was with civil suits, not with constitutional
violations. No one ever discusses whether it casts prosecutors, and law
enforcement more generally, in a bad light when evidence of constitutional
violations—especially intentional ones—surfaces. 118
2. The Over-Deterred-Official Argument
The utilitarian argument also connotes that there is no way, short of
implicitly repudiating constitutional rights, to safeguard officials’
willingness to exercise their powers. 119 It should go without saying that
official power in the United States never embraces the power to violate the
Constitution. It is not clear why officials should be empowered to act
without considering the constitutionality of their conduct. Even stipulating
113. See infra notes 120–32 and accompanying text.
114. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 859–60.
115. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
116. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 860 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424).
117. See id.
118. The most recent example in the Supreme Court (and one of the most egregious
examples in history) is Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). New Orleans
prosecutors charged Thompson with a murder, seeking the death penalty, and an unrelated
robbery, and obtained convictions for both in separate trials. Id. at 1356. During the
proceedings, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), see Connick, 131 S. Ct.
at 1357, the prosecutors concealed evidence, such as blood from the perpetrator of the
robbery and prior inconsistent descriptions of the perpetrator of the murder by a witness who
testified for the prosecution at the murder trial, see id. at 1371–74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
When the concealed evidence came to light, the prosecutor’s office withdrew the robbery
charge, and a Louisiana court ordered retrial of the murder case, in which the jury returned a
not guilty verdict in 35 minutes. See id. at 1356–57 (majority opinion); id. at 1376
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Thompson then sought damages for his wrongful convictions,
asserting claims under § 1983. Id. at 1357 (majority opinion). The jury returned with a
plaintiff’s verdict and awarded him $14 million in damages for the eighteen years he had
spent in prison, fourteen of them on death row. Id. at 1355, 1357. The Supreme Court did
not dispute the jury’s findings, but reversed on the grounds of municipal immunity. Id. at
1359–60, 1365–66. Given the underlying facts, it is not clear why the prosecutors who
participated directly in Thompson’s criminal cases could not be charged with attempted
murder under Louisiana law. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:27, 14:30.1 (2007). For
another shocking example, consider Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2010)
(detailing allegations of a police investigation that involved coercion of child witnesses,
deliberate misrepresentations by police to children and parents and other constitutional
violations of defendants’ rights that, although the court was unable to grant habeas corpus
relief because of the one-year limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), caused the court strongly
to recommend that the district attorney reinvestigate the case).
119. See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 (arguing that “harassment by unfounded litigation
would cause a deflection of the prosecutors energies from his public duties, and the
possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of
judgment required by his public trust”).
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that is a desirable outcome (at least in some extreme circumstances that
demand instantaneous action), one can relieve officials’ anxiety by having
their governments provide a defense for them and indemnity to them if a
court finds they have committed a transgression.
Some jurisdictions do that. In 1976, New York specifically provided
such relief, 120 with some limitations that are particularly instructive because
they echo common law practice. If an official acts outside the laws or
instructions of her employer, she stands before the law as an individual.121
If she acts within those constraints, even if a court subsequently finds that
her actions have violated federal law that was obligatory upon the employer
by supremacy, the employer shoulders the burden of defense and
liability. 122
It is a market system in microcosm. The employer will not countenance
the employee violating the employer’s rules. Within those rules, it wants
the employee to act without fear of adverse personal consequences
stemming from the violations of federal law, so it agrees to pay for the
privilege. It releases the employee from having to anticipate new
developments in the federal law before acting. One hopes that in all clear
cases, officials will be aware of federal law and will conform their conduct.
The statute offers relief in close cases, where official action consonant with
state law may nonetheless violate federal law, though it is not clear whether
it does. 123 So there is a way to ensure that officials invested with discretion
will not hesitate to exercise it.
New York did not invent that idea. Congress did, more than 160 years
earlier. 124 From the nation’s beginning through at least the mid-nineteenth
century, the assumption was that individuals should and did have effective
remedies for injuries suffered from official misconduct.125 A scholarly
canvass of early American cases concluded that it was the truly exceptional
case in which the plaintiff could not recover for official wrongdoing.126
Recovery ostensibly came from the official, but Congress passed private
bills authorizing indemnity (as, apparently, almost everyone expected). 127
“[W]hile the right to indemnity was understood in contractual terms, the
practice of securing a determination of the right to indemnity almost

120. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k (McKinney 2007).
121. See id. § 50-k(2).
122. Id. Section 50-k(5) relieves the employer of its burdens if the offense occurs while
the employee is subject to a departmental disciplinary proceeding and if he is not exonerated.
Id. § 50-k(5).
123. The Supreme Court has taken governments off the hook in such situations by
abolishing official liability unless the constitutional right asserted is “clearly established.”
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see supra notes 98–99 and accompanying
text. In this respect, the New York legislature acted more responsibly than the Supreme
Court by recognizing that constitutional injury deserves redress.
124. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 76, at 1866–67, 1888 (explaining that Congress
provided indemnification through private legislation).
125. See id. at 1929–30.
126. See id. at 1904–14.
127. See id. at 1911–12.
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invariably entailed the submission of a petition to Congress for the adoption
of private legislation.” 128
“Congress applied established agency theory in determining whether to
grant relief.” 129 In effect, the early Congress accepted respondeat superior
liability, an interesting contrast to the modern Court’s view that the
Reconstruction Congresses would never have contemplated such liability
for municipalities it had subjected to the Civil Rights Act of 1871.130
Before the Civil War, when officials had acted in accord with their
instructions and in good faith,
Congress concluded that the government should bear responsibility for the
loss; the [officials] were acting as honest agents of the government in
taking the action that led to the imposition of liability. When, by way of
contrast, the government official acted outside the scope of his agency or
beyond the authority conferred by law or his instructions, the officer was
left to bear any resulting liability on his own. 131

Private legislation provided indemnity about 60 percent of the time the
official found liable sought such relief.132 In contrast, the modern Court
has substituted its own poorly disguised policy judgment that the
community should not bear the cost of its agents’ constitutional errors; the
victim of the unconstitutional conduct should.
3. The Inconvenient Hierarchy
Most important, immunities upset the hierarchy the Supremacy Clause
establishes. As Butz v. Economou 133 pointed out, “the doctrine of official
immunity from § 1983 liability . . . [is] not constitutionally grounded.”134
If any immunity other than legislative immunity rests on a constitutional
basis, attorneys representing officials seem at some pains to conceal it.
During oral argument in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 135 the Acting Solicitor General
conceded that the Court’s absolute immunity doctrines are of less than
constitutional stature.136 Justice Alito asked why, if former Attorney
General Ashcroft’s conduct was lawful under the Fourth Amendment, the
Court should decide the question of absolute immunity.
Counsel
responded: “I think that’s the way this Court has historically gone about it,
probably for reasons of constitutional avoidance, to not reach constitutional
questions if there’s an absolute immunity question.” 137 If applying

128. Id. at 1866.
129. Id. at 1906.
130. See infra notes 187–99 and accompanying text.
131. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 76, at 1907.
132. See id. at 1867.
133. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
134. Id. at 497 (emphasis added) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)); accord
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) (“We think there must be a degree of
immunity if the work of the schools is to go forward.”).
135. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
136. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 102, at 9.
137. Id.
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immunity doctrine is constitutional avoidance, 138 then immunity itself
cannot be constitutional doctrine.139 That calls into question the legitimacy
of any immunity (whether individual or governmental) that the Constitution
does not establish. On what principled basis can sub-constitutional doctrine
trump constitutional rights?
The Court has flirted with this reasoning, but the decisions it makes
supporting officials’ insulation from actions for damages are inconsistent
with its statements of constitutional principle. For example, in Economou,
the majority noted “the general rule, which long prevailed, that a federal
official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling
law has placed on his powers.” 140 The Court also mentioned the
longstanding rule that a federal official acting in excess of his “federal
statutory authority” was liable for “his trespassory acts.” 141 A fortiori,142
official violations of the Constitution should be subject to judicial remedy,
as Economou recognized: “Since an unconstitutional act, even if authorized
by statute, was viewed as not authorized in contemplation of law, there
could be no immunity defense.” 143
Having championed legal supremacy, and having relied explicitly upon
both Lee and Marbury for the proposition that “all individuals, whatever
their position in government, are subject to federal law,”144 the Court
promptly forgot its own lesson. It reaffirmed qualified immunity for federal
executive officials, resting not on constitutional principle or the political
philosophy that underlies it, but on naked expediency: reasons of public
policy, which Justice White elaborated with respect to participants in the

138. Justice Brandeis explained this doctrine in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936):
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other
a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
latter.
Id. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
139. Of course, states’ general immunity from suit by an individual in federal court, see
U.S. CONST. amend. XI, despite all of its uncertainties and fuzzy boundaries, see infra note
184 and accompanying text, is of constitutional stature.
140. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489 (1978).
141. Id. at 490.
142. See id. at 495 (“[I]f [federal officials] are accountable when they stray beyond the
plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be incongruous to hold that they may
nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional rights without fear of liability.”).
143. Id. at 490–91 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218–23 (1882)). In fact, the
Court advanced several powerful arguments explaining why absolute immunity for executive
officials is antithetical to constitutional supremacy. See, e.g., id. at 505 (“If, as the
Government argues, all officials exercising discretion were exempt from personal liability, a
suit under the Constitution could provide no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in
any degree deter federal officials from committing constitutional wrongs. Moreover, no
compensation would be available from the Government, for the Tort Claims Act prohibits
recovery for injuries stemming from discretionary acts, even when that discretion has been
abused.” (footnote omitted)).
144. Economou, 438 U.S. at 506.
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judicial process generally. 145 He argued that safeguards within the judicial
process make remedies external to it less necessary. 146 He did not say that
such remedies were unnecessary, leaving one to wonder about the
apparently non-constitutional balance the Court uses to ignore
constitutional rights when the judicial process’s internal restraints fail to
protect them.
Economou rested explicitly on Imbler, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 147 Wood, and
Pierson v. Ray. 148 Regrettably—perhaps predictably—none of those cases
mention any constitutional principle that allows an immunity not found in
the Constitution to prevent enforcement of a right that is. Pierson involved
immunity for a state judge, and the Court held only that the Civil Rights
Act 149 did not abolish judges’ common law immunity from civil suit for
performance of their judicial duties. 150 It did not discuss whether that is
compatible with the Constitution. The Court later held that the criminal
counterpart to § 1983 recognized no immunity. 151
Scheuer came down seven years after Pierson and, although Harlow
discarded it, the majority opinion remains of interest because of its
argument for official immunities and their historical background. Chief
Justice Burger noted that official immunities find their roots in the same
considerations as sovereign immunity, identifying two “mutually dependent
rationales”:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to
liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position,
to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would
deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the
judgment required by the public good. 152

The first assumes away something Professor Dworkin identified:
“Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left
open by a surrounding belt of restriction.” 153 The Court spoke of discretion
as if it were free-floating, untethered to the limits of the power that the law
confers. It committed the classic error of keeping its eye upon the hole and
ignoring the doughnut. Chief Justice Marshall spoke more than two
hundred years ago about duty and discretion:
[W]hat is there in the exalted station of the officer, which shall bar a
citizen from asserting, in a court of justice, his legal rights, or shall forbid
a court to listen to the claim, or to issue a mandamus, directing the

145. See id. at 506–07.
146. See id. at 512.
147. 416 U.S. 232 (1974), abrogated by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
148. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
150. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553–54.
151. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
152. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240. The Chief Justice did not comment on the possible
injustice of leaving an individual who has suffered constitutional injury without remedy.
153. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 31.
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performance of a duty, not depending on executive discretion, but on
particular acts of congress and the general principles of law? 154

Discretion cannot justify violating constitutional rights. It is important
that Scheuer traced its rationale back to sovereign immunity. It is more
important that it overlooked the maxim that the King can do no wrong,155
upon which the Court had partially relied in Ex parte Young 156: “The State
has no power to impart to [an official] any immunity from responsibility to
the supreme authority of the United States.”157 Neither the Supreme Court,
acting as a common law court in creating sub-constitutional immunities, nor
Congress, enacting statutes, has such power.
Yet, the whole thrust of an immunity is that it excuses violation of a
right, not that it abrogates or modifies the right.158 The immunity cases do
not purport to narrow the scope of the constitutional rights plaintiffs assert.
Scheuer did not say that the Fourteenth Amendment entitlement to
protection from state deprivation of life or liberty was any narrower than the
plaintiffs claimed. Compare that decision with Paul v. Davis, 159 where the
Court did say that Davis’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest did not
protect reputation simpliciter. 160
This leads to another mistake the Court makes repeatedly in civil rights
actions, most often under § 1983, to enforce constitutional rights. Professor
Tribe might have catalogued it as an eighth deadly sin (although it would
have ruined his article’s title): the sin of asking the wrong question. 161 The
Court repeatedly asks whether Congress, enacting § 1983, intended to
abrogate common law immunities.162 There are three reasons this is the
wrong question.
First, as the Court acknowledged in Imbler, § 1983 is silent about
immunities. 163 After acknowledging that silence, Justice Powell pointed
154. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
155. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.
156. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
157. Id. at 160.
158. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
159. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
160. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Paul distinguished Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), as having held that where government defamation also
cuts off exercise of a state privilege, it is actionable under § 1983. See Paul, 424 U.S. at
708–09.
161. See generally Tribe, supra note 104.
162. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (“Did Congress by the general
language of its 1871 statute mean to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in
England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National
Governments here?”); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976) (“The decision
in Tenney established that § 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort
immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.”); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 317 (1975) (citing Tenney for the proposition that “there was no basis for believing that
Congress intended to eliminate the traditional immunity of legislators from civil liability for
acts done within their sphere of legislative action.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967) (“The legislative record [of § 1983] gives no clear indication that Congress meant to
abolish wholesale all common law immunities.”).
163. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417.
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out in the next breath that “[this] view has not prevailed.” 164 He framed the
issue instead as “whether the Reconstruction Congress had intended to
restrict the availability in § 1983 suits of those immunities which
historically, and for reasons of public policy, had been accorded to various
categories of officials.” 165 The Court’s approach assumes that Congress
could constitutionally enact a statute making a constitutional right
unenforceable. This overlooks that § 1983 does not concern itself with the
existence vel non of any substantive right or any immunity. 166 The
Constitution and statutes other than § 1983 create the rights. The Court has
created the immunities, apparently based on the unstated hypothesis 167 that
the Framers silently chose to leave in place a supposed immunity structure
that made the United States government even less accountable for
violations of fundamental rights than the British monarchy had been.168
Given that several states’ documents ratifying the Constitution included
specific proposed amendments to protect fundamental rights, some of
which promptly found their way into the Bill of Rights,169 that hypothesis is
extraordinarily unlikely.
Second, there is a historical problem with the Court’s analysis. Consider
the state officials the 1871 Congress had in mind when it passed § 1983.
Think of the conditions that prevailed in 1871 and impelled Congress to act.
Monroe v. Pape 170 discussed them at some length, focusing not merely on
violence attributable to the Ku Klux Klan but repeatedly on the states’
164. Id.
165. Id. at 417–18.
166. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979).
167. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
168. The colonists’ rights as English citizens included remedies for official misconduct,
both against the officials and against the Crown. See supra notes 19–26, 54–63 and
accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Resolution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1788), in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 93; Ratification Document of the State of New
York (1788), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 190. Explicitly recognizing the
states’ concerns, Congress rapidly proposed a dozen amendments, ten of which became the
Bill of Rights. See Resolution of Congress Proposing Amendatory Articles to the Several
States, 1 Stat. 97 (1789), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 321
(quoting Congress’s resolution, explaining that it proposed the Bill of Rights because “[the]
Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution,
expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further
declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public
confidence in the Government, will best ensure the beneficent ends of its institution.”); see
also BOWEN, supra note 9, at 245 (noting that “nothing created such an uproar [about
ratification] as the lack of a bill of rights.”). Americans’ interest in a bill of rights antedated
the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, and even the outbreak of open hostilities in
the Revolution. See MAIER, supra note 39, at 245 (noting interest in an American Bill of
Rights recognized by England as a way of mending the split between the colonies and
England). Interestingly, the Constitutional Convention had considered a bill of rights, but
then rejected it as unnecessary. See BOWEN, supra note 9, at 244–45 & note. Some Framers
believed “the Constitution covered the matter as it stood.” Id. at 245. Alexander Hamilton
went further, arguing that “a bill of rights . . . . would be dangerous” because there was no
need to “‘declare that things shall not be done which there is no power [in Congress] to do.’”
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)).
170. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

2011]

TAKING SUPREMACY SERIOUSLY

469

inability or unwillingness to enforce the law, depriving citizens of equal
protection of the laws. 171 The Court in Wood, however, asks us to believe
that the 1871 Congress was greatly concerned with retaining immunity
from constitutional suit for officials responsible for enforcing the law who
failed or refused to do so or who themselves violated the Constitution:
“Common law tradition, recognized in our prior decisions, and strong
public-policy reasons also lead to a construction of § 1983 extending a
qualified good-faith immunity to school board members from liability from
damages under that section.” 172 That is also an unlikely hypothesis. Given
that § 1983 clearly targets state officials violating federal rights “under
color of any law . . . of any State,” 173 providing or assuming immunities
would have undermined Congress’s purpose.
The Court has written strongly about § 1983’s remedial scope and
Congress’s clear intentions. In Mitchum v. Foster, 174 the Court noted that
“[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights—to
protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law,
‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.’” 175 There was
no dissent. Given that background, the modern Court’s creation of
immunities for the persons and entities whose actions (or inactions) so
clearly concerned and motivated the 1871 Congress (not to mention the
Court’s attribution of those immunities to an invisible congressional intent)
would be laughable if the consequences were not so serious.176 Professor
171. Id. at 172–76.
172. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975). Given the post-Civil War context, it
is natural to conclude that uppermost in the Reconstruction Congresses’ minds was the
vexing problem of immunity for local school and school board officials.
173. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
174. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). Mitchum concerned whether a federal court could enjoin a
state court from proceeding in a pending public nuisance action under § 1983 without
running afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
175. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879))
(emphasis added). The Court also quoted extensively from the congressional debates on
§ 1983’s predecessor. See id. at 240–41. It would be misleading, however, to consider
Mitchum in isolation from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), whose holding the
Mitchum Court expressly preserved. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243. The Younger majority
argued that Congress had not intended § 1983 to subordinate “the national policy forbidding
federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. Curiously, the Court cited—but did not rely on—
the Anti-Injunction Act, which exempts injunctions that Congress had “expressly
authorized.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283; see Younger, 401 U.S. at 43, 54. Instead, it reasoned that
federalism considerations counseled the federal courts to exercise restraint in enjoining state
courts, especially pending state criminal proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45, 52–54.
Perhaps the Justices anticipated Mitchum’s holding that § 1983 is an “expressly authorized”
exception to § 2283, see Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242–43; one cannot know. For present
purposes, the important thing is that cases involving official immunities are civil damage
actions; they do not involve enjoining the pending state criminal prosecutions at issue in
Younger. That abstention doctrine and its underlying rationale are not at issue in the official
immunity cases.
176. The immunities should be an especially uncomfortable bone in the throat of those
Justices who consider themselves to be originalists in whole or in part.
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Zeigler’s extensive research on the legislative history of the civil rights bills
of the late 1860s and early 1870s amply documents Congress’s quite selfconscious intent to authorize federal actions against state officials,
including judges, who participated in constitutional violations. 177
Third, the Court overlooks that § 1983 is only part of the story of
protecting civil rights during Reconstruction. Congress had earlier passed a
statute providing criminal penalties for violating citizens’ federal rights
under color of state law178 and amended it in 1874 to include some of the
critical language from § 1983. 179 The Court’s cases concerning the
criminal section do not even hint at the existence of any immunity.180
Neither statute mentions immunities, and so neither gives any indication of
congressional intent to embody the common law immunities the Court
repeatedly asserts were so well established. Yet, the Court interprets
congressional silence implicitly to adopt common law immunity defenses in
the civil arena (§ 1983) and to dispense with them in the criminal arena
(§ 242), thus providing broader protection of constitutional rights under the
criminal statute. 181
C. Municipal Immunity
Given the preceding discussion of sovereign and official immunities, it
will not be a stretch for the reader to infer the following view of municipal
immunity. Monell v. Department of Social Services182 reinterpreted § 1983
to include municipalities within § 1983’s concept of “person.”183 It did not
take long for the immunity question to arise; Owen v. City of
Independence 184 reached the Court two years after Monell. A five-to-four
Court held that there was no qualified immunity for the municipality and

177. See generally Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light
of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987.
178. See The Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted and amended by Act of
May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006)).
179. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 99 (1945) (noting that the 1874
amendment added “the prohibition against the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States,’” which
was borrowed from § 1983).
180. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787 (1966).
181. I had always thought that courts construed criminal statutes narrowly, see, e.g.,
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (2009), and remedial statutes
liberally, see, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (1
Wall.) 493, 504 (1870) (“The statute is a remedial one and should be construed liberally to
carry out the wise and salutary purposes of its enactment.”).
182. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
183. In this respect, Monell overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which had
held the exact opposite only seventeen years earlier. Monell, 436 U.S. at 663.
184. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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that the qualified immunity of its officials did not extend to the municipality
itself 185 because there was no common law immunity for municipalities. 186
However, Monell created a quasi-immunity by declining to allow
respondeat superior liability, limiting liability to more direct municipal
action. 187 Justice Brennan’s painstaking analysis of § 1983’s legislative
history noted that Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment, which
would have made municipalities liable “for damage done to the person or
property of its inhabitants by private persons ‘riotously and tumultuously
assembled.’” 188 That led the Court to conclude that Congress implicitly
forbade respondeat superior liability for much the same reasons.189 Yet that
conclusion is at least highly questionable.
Rejection of the Sherman Amendment rested on Congress’s
unwillingness to impose peacekeeping duties on municipalities because
municipalities did not commonly have police forces. 190 In Congress’s
view, municipalities had no duty to control the Ku Klux Klan or other
mobs. 191 On the other hand, municipalities are principals to their agents
and principals have a duty to control their own agents;192 making
municipalities liable under § 1983 for their agents’ official misconduct
would not have imposed any new duty. Professor Achtenberg views
Congress’s failure to enact the Sherman Amendment not as rejecting
respondeat superior, but rather as affirming the concepts that underlie the

185. Id. at 638–50. Dean Chemerinsky thinks that “[t]he Court’s reasoning in Owen is
open to criticism.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.5.3, at 523 (5th ed.
2007). Perhaps so, but its holding remains the law because the Court has not overruled it.
186. Owen, 445 U.S. at 638. On the other hand, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247 (1981), the Court ruled that § 1983 did not expose municipalities to punitive
damages because municipalities were not liable for those damages at common law. Id. at
259–71.
187. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95 (“We conclude, therefore, that a local government may
not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it
is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury
that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”).
188. Id. at 664 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 749 (1871)).
189. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 185, at 510; David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History
Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat
Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2196 (2005).
190. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 670 n.21.
191. See id.
192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b, at 141 (2006) (explaining that
a principal is liable for an agent’s torts within the scope of their employment only if the
principal has the right to control the agent’s actions).
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doctrine. 193 Nonetheless, Monell ruled the other way, and there has been no
retreat from that holding. 194
In one way, the Court has strengthened that part of Monell. Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati 195 held that decisions of municipal officials with “final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered”
qualified as municipal action.196 More recently, Board of County
Commissioners v. Brown 197 effectively (though not explicitly) overruled
Pembaur: the Court decided that it was not sufficient that the municipal
agent was a policymaker and had made a single decision.198 Instead, the
majority ruled that if the official decision was not itself unconstitutional, the
plaintiff in a § 1983 action had to “show that the municipal action was
taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct
causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal
rights.” 199 As a result, it became far more difficult for the policymaker’s
isolated decision to cast the municipality in liability, as it had in Pembaur.
Municipal immunity suffers from the same hierarchical difficulty as
official immunities. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, Congress has no
power to declare exemptions from the supremacy of the Constitution under
Article VI, and no clause in the Constitution confers such a power on the
federal courts. 200 Congress also lacks the power to declare either that a
constitutional provision is more or less inclusive than the Supreme Court
says it is, 201 or to overturn judicial constitutional decisions by statute.202
Although the Court ruled almost two centuries ago that the Bill of Rights
did not apply to non-federal officials or entities, 203 by now, almost all the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, incorporated through the Fourteenth
193. See Achtenberg, supra note 189, at 2196–97. He observes that Monell used a
twentieth-century lens to analyze a statute enacted against the backdrop of a nineteenthcentury understanding of respondeat superior. See id. at 2198 (“[H]owever arcane or illogical
the legal unity concept may have seemed to members of the Court in 1978 when Monell was
written, it was a familiar legal truism to members of Congress in 1871 when § 1983 was
enacted.”); id. at 2199 (“[T]he Monell Court, writing more than one hundred years later,
anachronistically discounted control as a justification for employer liability.”).
194. Several Justices have suggested reconsidering Monell for exactly the reasons that
Professor Achtenberg points out. See Achtenberg, supra note 189, at 2196; see also Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430–37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
196. Id. at 481.
197. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
198. Id. at 404.
199. Id.
200. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Justice Brandeis was
addressing the legitimacy of the federal courts creating common law in areas in which
Congress lacked legislative authority. The argument applies by analogy but with even
greater force here because of (supposed) constitutional supremacy.
201. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20, 527–29 (1997).
202. The Supreme Court made the latter unmistakably clear in Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428 (2000), holding that Congress’s attempt to overrule Miranda—by passing a
law purporting to make voluntariness the only standard for a confession’s admissibility, see
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 Stat.
197, 210 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2006))—was unavailing and effectively
unconstitutional, see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441–44.
203. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247–48, 250–52 (1833).
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause, do apply to state and local governments
and officials. 204 The Supremacy Clause prevents any state or local
government from opting out of the commands of those provisions.
CONCLUSION
The Supremacy Clause binds the Court every bit as much as it binds
Congress, the President, the states, their localities and their officials. If a
municipality violates constitutional rights, no branch of state or federal
government has the power to excuse that violation. Only two legitimate
possibilities exist to allow the government, its officials, and municipalities
to avoid liability. First, the Supreme Court can declare that the
constitutional right itself is not broad enough to reach the municipal
conduct. Second, Congress and the states can invoke the constitutional
amendment procedure of Article V.
With regard to the first possibility, the Court has declined to interpret the
constitutional rights narrowly in any of the immunity cases, whether dealing
with official or municipal immunities.205 In fact, its veneration of common
law immunity doctrines shows no signs of abating, and in the past decade,
the Court has radically moved away from interpreting the constitutional
rights themselves. In 2001, Saucier v. Katz206 directed the federal courts in
qualified immunity cases to consider whether “the facts alleged show that
the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” before considering
whether the constitutional right asserted was well enough established to
avoid the qualified immunity defense.207 The Court explained why that
sequence was important:
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated
on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set forth
principles which will become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly
established. This is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to
case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon turning to the existence or
nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law might
be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the
question whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was
unlawful in the circumstances of the case. 208

Thus, after Saucier, accretion of individual constitutional rights might
still occur. Then, in 2009, Pearson v. Callahan 209 made Saucier’s
mandated sequence of inquiry optional.210 Late in its 2010 Term, the Court
further strengthened officials’ insulation from constitutional obligation. In

204. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 10.2, 11.6, at 396–99, 462–67 (7th ed. 2004).
205. See supra notes 134–59 and accompanying text.
206. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
207. Id. at 201.
208. Id.
209. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
210. Id. at 236.
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Camreta v. Greene, 211 the Ninth Circuit had found that the defendant
officials had committed a Fourth Amendment violation but that “qualified
immunity shielded the officials from monetary liability because the
constitutional right at issue was not clearly established under existing
law.” 212 The Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the officials. 213 Despite their victory, the officials
sought and received Supreme Court review, 214 after which the Court
“vacate[d] the part of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that addressed [the Fourth
Amendment] issue, and remand[ed] for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.” 215
Camreta, by reviewing and vacating part of an opinion216 at the behest of
the prevailing party below, appears to be the death blow to the Saucier
sequence and to the prospect of “the law’s elaboration from case to case”
that only a decade ago seemed so important to the Court.217 Furthermore,
six justices in both Camreta and al-Kidd, 218 another immunity case decided
in the 2010 Term, expressed their preference for deciding issues on
immunity grounds rather than the Constitution.219 If the Court has
211. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
212. Id. at 2026.
213. Id. at 2027.
214. That the Court allowed itself to review the case raises myriad issues relating to
standing, mootness, and advisory opinions, as the Justices’ opinions discussed. Fortunately,
all of those issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
215. Id. at 2036. Of course, the only thing consistent with the Court’s opinion was the
summary judgment for the defendant officials, which the Ninth Circuit had affirmed in the
first place. See id. at 2027.
216. As Justice Kennedy’s dissent pointed out, the Court has said before that it sits to
review judgments, not opinions. Id. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting California v.
Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987) (per curiam)). Justice Kennedy also quoted from Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945):
“[O]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not
permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be
rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.”
Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2037–38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at
125–26). It is difficult to see how the Camreta decision is anything but advisory. See supra
note 215 and accompanying text.
217. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
218. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). The al-Kidd case involved a Bivens
action against former Attorney General John Ashcroft, alleging that he authorized federal
officials to misuse the Material Witness Statute and arrest suspected terrorists without
probable cause. See id. at 2079. The Ninth Circuit decided that the complaint alleged a
Fourth Amendment violation and that neither qualified nor absolute prosecutorial immunity
was available because the constitutional violation was clearly established. Id. A majority of
the Supreme Court reversed both the determination that the allegations constituted a
constitutional violation and the ruling that the violation was clearly established. See id. at
2080, 2085.
219. See id. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“objecting to the Court’s disposition of alKidd’s Fourth Amendment claim on the merits . . . [because] that claim involves novel and
trying questions that will ‘have no effect on the outcome of th[is] case’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009))); id. at 2089–90
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (same); Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(expressing a willingness “to end the extraordinary practice of ruling upon constitutional
questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses qualified immunity . . . in an
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completely abandoned Saucier, it is easy to see how individual
constitutional rights may diminish if the Court contracts the previously
understood scope of a constitutional provision to avoid an official’s
liability. It is hard to see how the Court’s rejection of Saucier will allow
more expansive understandings of constitutional rights. 220
Since the Court has not used the immunity cases to narrow its
interpretation of the underlying constitutional rights, 221 the only legitimate
way to limit their scope is by constitutional amendment. Sub-constitutional
immunity doctrines for governments and their officials violate
constitutional supremacy. If the Constitution declares a right or a
limitation, only another constitutional provision can alter it or set it aside.
Congress could not legislate an end to Prohibition; it took another
amendment. 222 The Court asks the wrong question when it considers
whether Congress intended to set aside what the Court characterizes as
unquestioned common law immunities. Even if § 1983 did indicate its
congressional support for such immunities, it would be irrelevant. The
rights come from the Constitution; neither the common law nor a mere
statute can overrule or modify constitutional provisions.
That is why all of the Court-created immunities to constitutional claims
are structurally illegitimate. The Constitution provides two immunities,
which we must respect or undo through amendment. The Speech and
Debate Clause 223 immunizes federal legislators, and the Eleventh
Amendment 224 confers some sort of immunity on the states against being
made defendants at the suit of individuals in a federal forum. 225 No other
immunity finds mention. Why not?
appropriate case”); id. at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting, with Justice Thomas, that
“[i]f today’s decision proves to be more than an isolated anomaly, the Court might find it
necessary to reconsider its special permission that the Courts of Appeals may issue
unnecessary merits determinations in qualified immunity cases with binding precedential
effect”).
220. Camreta seems to eliminate the possibility of any accretion of constitutional rights
happening in civil suits. The only possibility for expansion lies in defense of criminal
actions, yet this may be extraordinarily difficult. At issue in Camreta was a warrantless
interview with a child at her school by a state child protective services worker and a deputy
sheriff. They sought evidence of abuse by the child’s father. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at
2027. The state charged the father with abuse but was unable to obtain a conviction. Id. If
the state had sought to introduce evidence from the interview against the father in the
criminal proceeding, he would have lacked standing to object on Fourth Amendment
grounds. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05 (1980) (holding that
defendant must show he personally possessed “a legitimate expectation of privacy in” the
searched item); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34, 139–40 (1977) (“A person who is
aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging
evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his
Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”).
221. See supra notes 135–59, 205–15 and accompanying text.
222. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
223. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
224. Id. amend. XI.
225. It is not possible to simplify Eleventh Amendment law; one can only over-simplify
it. It is not even possible to say whether the Eleventh Amendment concerns federal subject
matter jurisdiction (not waivable) or a state immunity (waivable). The Supreme Court has
attributed both aspects to it, and in the same case. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
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The Court views the immunity cases in a hypothetical vacuum because
the Court considers them without reference to the historical context in
which the individual rights came into existence. It tries to predict what
might happen if it decides against the immunity the governmental defendant
asserts. The colonists fought the revolution because of their pervasive
feeling that the English government under George III denied them the rights
They rebelled against arbitrary and unlawful
of Englishmen. 226
government action against the colonies as entities and against the colonists
as individuals. 227 They complained that the courts were beholden only to
the King and disregarded legal injuries the colonists suffered.228 After they
finally formed a lasting national government in 1787, one of the first things
they did was to add the Bill of Rights. Several states’ ratification
documents had urged swift drafting, presentation, and ratification of a bill
of rights. 229
Against that background, I must borrow Robert Bolt’s language from his
play about Sir Thomas More. 230 Is it probable that after so long a struggle
against the Crown’s denial of the rights of Englishmen, the people who
created the new nation would have established governments not
accountable for violations of fundamental individual rights? Is it probable
that having urged the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, the
people would have made those rights unenforceable against governments
and officials who violated them? Is it probable that people who had
suffered from a government that had refused to honor the established law of
the land 231 would immediately adopt a Constitution that did not bind the
government or its officials to respect the individual rights that the colonists
had asserted for so long and had paid so dearly to secure?
As I wrote at the outset, 232 the Constitution has only two purposes: to
create government and to restrain it. The Constitution cannot enforce itself;
it depends on a government responsive to its philosophy and sensitive to its
limitations. When the Court recognizes common law immunity doctrines, it
651, 673–78 (1974) (discussing states’ ability to waive their Eleventh Amendment protection
(though not finding a waiver) while overturning the Court of Appeals’ refusal to honor the
state’s invocation of the Eleventh Amendment for the first time at the appellate level). A full
examination of this issue is beyond this Article’s scope.
226. One need look no further than to the particulars that Thomas Jefferson recited. See
generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
227. See, e.g., id. paras. 4–8.
228. See id. para. 11.
229. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
230. See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS act 2, at 156 (1962). The scene is
More’s trial. Richard Rich, a false friend whom More refused a recommendation for a
position at court, see id. at 6–9, has just testified for the prosecution that More spoke to him
while imprisoned and denied Parliament’s power to declare King Henry VIII the head of the
Anglican Church. See id. at 155–56. That was treason. More’s reaction marks the turning
point of the trial: “Is it probable—is it probable—that after so long a silence on this, the
very point so urgently sought of me, I should open my mind to such a man as that?” Id. at
156 (emphasis added).
231. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (referring to the king’s
“usurpations”).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18.
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makes the Constitution less than the “supreme Law of the Land.”233 It does
not even pretend to do so on the basis of any law or principle that rises to a
constitutional level. 234 Even more, it reduces the rights-declaring portions
of the Constitution to not being law at all. If something is not enforceable,
it is not a law. A right declared but unenforceable is not a right. If
individuals’ rights are not enforceable against the governments and
government officials who violate them, then to whom do they apply, and
whom do they protect? The Court’s immunity doctrines read those rights
out of the Constitution. They repudiate the rule of law. 235
Justice Brandeis memorably cautioned about the signal importance of
government obeying the Constitution:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if
it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration
of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the
Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a
private criminal—would bring terrible retribution.
Against that
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. 236

Justice Brandeis also reminded 237 us about Chief Justice Marshall’s
famous admonition: “[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding.” 238 By its repeated ventures into the sub-constitutional
doctrines of official immunities, the Court has done precisely what the
Chief Justice feared: it has forgotten.

233. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
234. See supra notes 134–60 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., DICEY, supra note 50, at 202–03 (“[T]he ‘rule of law’ . . . excludes the idea
of any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs
other citizens or from the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals . . . .”).
236. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 205 (“If the Government does not take rights seriously,
then it does not take law seriously either.”).
237. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
238. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).

